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Transnational Climate Law as a Visual Field

Climate change leaves little on this planet untouched. The concept of transnational law is
no exception. Transnational law has long functioned as a mechanism for illuminating
particular legal subjects, processes, and spaces: the empty space left by existing doctrinal
perspectives,1 the relationships between, around and outside of national laws,2 the
importance for law of private actors and the power and powerlessness of those actors.3 It
offers a way of opening our eyes to spheres of normativity other than the nation state and
distinct ways of conceiving of the nation state itself. But climate change shatters the idea
that jurisdictional borders and doctrinal debates about the scope of the ‘legal’ are the sole
tensions with which a concept of transnational law must contend. Climate change exposes
a further fault line underlying legal thought and practice – the problematic, but deep-rooted
1

Gralf-Peter Calliess and Peer Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code: A Theory of
Transnational Private Law (Oxford: Hart, 2010), 11.
2
Peer Zumbansen, “Defining the Space of Transnational Law: Legal Theory, Global Governance, and
Legal Pluralism,” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 21, no. 2 (June 2012): 307.
3
Transnational law scholarship continues to grapple with how to incorporate accounts of diverse actors and
agents in ways that complement, rather than simply replicate, political science vocabularies. See Natasha
Affolder, “Transnational Environmental Law’s Missing People,” Transnational Environmental Law
(2019), DOI: 10.1017/S2047102519000190.
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practice of separating ‘Human’ from ‘Nature.’ This separation, and its accompanying
assumption that the natural environment is a limitless resource for human exploitation, is
powerfully challenged by the reality of a dramatically changing planet, and the rise of
Anthropocene literatures that bring planetary limits sharply into view.
Transnational law is far from a homogenous field, approach, discourse, theory, or
methodology for approaching climate law. Nonetheless, core sympathies and
methodological elements of a transnational approach to climate law do exist alongside
tensions and disagreements. In this chapter, I resist cordoning off something called
‘transnational climate law’ as a distinct field of law.4 Instead, I approach transnational
climate law as visual field with methodological implications. Transnational law offers an
approach to understanding the globalization of law with a determined attentiveness to the
dynamic processes by which law crosses borders and has effects in multiple jurisdictions.5
The challenges of studying law “after the breakdown of methodological nationalism”6
create fertile ground for extending the ‘transnational’ from merely a ‘where’ inquiry to a
visual field capable of illuminating the ‘who’, the ‘how’, the ‘when’ and the ‘why’ of
transnational lawmaking.
Transnational law is a work-in-progress, valuable even as it operates as a placeholder – a
signifier that old vocabularies and ways of conceptualising legal actors, norms, and
relations are inadequate to the task of fully capturing what we are witnessing around us.
Climate law offers an illuminating point of entry for transnational law to assess misfits
between theory and practice, between existing legal concepts and vocabularies and
empirical realities. Words often fail to do justice to the dislocations and disruptions we are
witnessing.7 Transnational law represents one attempt to find a vocabulary, and a space,
4

This approach resonates with the conclusion that there is not a unified transnational order relating to
climate change, but rather both disorder and fragmentation. Daniel Bodansky, “Climate Change:
Transnational Legal Order or Disorder?” in Transnational Legal Orders, ed. Terence C. Halliday and
Gregory Shaffer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2015), 287–308.
5
Shaffer and Bodansky capture this well in their definition of transnational environmental law, which
“includes national environmental regulation that has horizontal effects across jurisdictions – for example,
by providing regulatory models to other countries or by applying to or affecting the behavior of producers
and consumers within them. It also includes the development of standards by private actors that have
effects across borders, such as through product certification and labeling regimes.” Gregory Shaffer and
Daniel Bodansky, “Transnationalism, Unilateralism and International Law,” Transnational Environmental
Law 1, no. 1 (2012): 32.
6
Ralf Michaels, “Globalization and Law: Law Beyond the State,” in Law and Social Theory, ed. Reza
Banakar and Mark Travers (Oxford: Hart, 2013), 287.
7
A point illustrated by the search for language to responsibly report on the climate crisis. See Damian
Carrington, ‘Why the Guardian is Changing the Language it Uses About the Environment’ The Guardian
(London, 17 May 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/may/17/why-the-guardian-ischanging-the-language-it-uses-about-the-environment>.
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for acknowledging the misalignment between the singularity of the nation state/interstate
framework that underlies much legal theory and the messy reality of the people, places and
forms of law that climate law-making brings into view. Moreover, climate law sharply
challenges the view that the only non-state actors of interest to transnational law are
globalized business interests.8
Even as climate law scholarship seems ever more unavoidably transnational,9 there is a
tendency to reserve the transnational law label for only those legal developments
happening outside the main tent of state and inter-state activity. This leads to a problematic
relegation of the transnational to an alternative universe or separate script (Section II). It
results in a superficial appreciation of transnational law, where what is noticed are the new
actors, assemblages and arrangements of climate governance. What risks getting missed
are the seismic legal transformations implicated by these new climate governance
arrangements. Approaching transnational climate law as a visual field offers a way of
challenging the separation of a transnational sphere from ‘the rest.’ Transnational climate
law thus offers a way of bringing into view an integrated picture of climate law’s
migrations (II.1), interactions (II.2) and revelations (II.3).
This chapter is not a marketing brochure for transnational law. As well as celebrating
transnational law’s capacity to bring neglected visions of law’s actors and law-making
processes into view, it is alert to what a transnational law lens might miss or obscure. The
spaces and rhythms of transnationalism favour a visual fix on processes, flows, networks,
and governance arrangements that may be only partially tethered to people.10 This leads to
several tensions. Climate law scholarship already tends to privilege accounts of a handful
of ‘innovative’ examples of legislation and lawsuits that bear the climate law label, leaving
untouched vast areas of law that facilitate or advance climate change. Environmental law
and clean energy law are the points of interest rather than the much larger subject areas of
unenvironmental law and unclean energy law (III.1). Transnational law has a still uncertain
relationship with legal ‘practice’ (III.2), and a tendency to work in terms of abstract
Acknowledging that transnational law is “most commonly seen in close relation to the demographics and
institutional formations of globalized business interests” and thus, that the reimagining of transnational law
as a ‘critlaw’ project is “anything but intuitive”, see Peer Zumbansen, “Can Transnational Law be Critical?
Reflections on a Contested Idea, Field and Methods” in Research Handbook on Critical International
Theory (2019, forthcoming), ed. Emilios Christodoulidis.
9
Much of the climate law literature referenced in Ronald Mitchell’s analysis of climate law’s
accomplishments speaks to transnational developments in the field even though transnational law is not an
explicit focus of that analysis. Ronald B. Mitchell, “Climate Law: Accomplishments and Areas for
Growth,” Climate Law 8, nos. 3–4 (2018): 135–50.
10
On some little-explored costs associated with the shift to the transnational in feminist legal theory, see
Mariana Valverde, Chronotopes of Law: Jurisdiction, Scale and Governance (London: Routledge, 2015),
106.
8
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processes rather than real ones populated by diverse actors (III.3). A transnational lens,
applied to climate change law, may thus risk writing out particular people and
understandings of nature from law’s past, present and future.
The concept of the Anthropocene has effectively ripped to shreds many of the analytical
categories that have served as frames for thinking about both the environment and law
since the Enlightenment. While social theorists are dismantling the intellectual walls that
separate human society from nonhuman nature, the geological from the generational, the
local from the global, and the scientific from the political, an appreciation of these same
cleavages is critical to understanding transnational law’s history and epistemology.11
Climate change is “legally disruptive”12 in ways that are only beginning to be understood.
Transnational climate law brings new boundaries into transnational law’s visual field –
planetary boundaries.
II.

Transnational Climate Law: Out of the Margins

The term ‘transnational climate law’ is not widely used to denote a recognized ‘field’ of
law.13 There may be good reasons for this. By framing transnational climate law as a field,
it becomes simply a new box, a box for misfits – things that fall outside the well-established
categories of international, national, regional and local climate change law.
Conceptualising transnational climate law as a field risks merely setting up a new box and
putting a new set of things within it, in the process obscuring the impact of the box’s
contents on everything left outside. The vital interactions between what is conceptualised
as the transnational and what is more comfortably seen as recognizable law gets missed.14
Transnational climate law has many sources upon which to draw, including pioneering
work from transnational environmental law and the ever-growing body of theoretical and
conceptual work on transnational law that has developed since Philip Jessup’s
Transnational Law (1956).15 That volume, written more than sixty years ago, identifies
some of the tensions and pressure points that are today manifest in approaching climate
change as a transnational legal problem. Jessup conceived of the transnational not as a
Perrin Selcer expresses this as the need to acknowledge “antiecological environmental history.” Perrin
Selcer, The Postwar Origins of the Global Environment: How the United Nations Built Spaceship Earth
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 11.
12
Elizabeth Fisher, Eloise Scotford, and Emily Barritt, “The Legally Disruptive Nature of Climate
Change,” Modern Law Review 80, no. 2 (March 2017): 173–201.
13
For an uncommon example of the term’s use, see Thijs Etty et al., “Editorial: Transnational Climate
Law,” Transnational Environmental Law 7, no. 2 (2018): 191–200.
14
Charles Roger, Thomas Hale, and Liliana Andonova, “The Comparative Politics of Transnational
Climate Governance,” International Interactions 43, no. 1 (2017): 2.
15
Philip C. Jessup, Transnational Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956).
11
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distinct realm from either the domestic or the international, but rather as an array of tools
and approaches to legal problems. Relevant sources of law extended far beyond public and
private international law to encompass a holding pen of possible, but not defined, “other
rules which do not wholly fit into such standard categories.”16
Jessup’s articulation of Transnational Law acknowledged the context of law-making in a
“complex interrelated world community,”17 clarifying both that law’s problems transcend
legal sub-disciplines and that they extend to the extra-legal or metajuridical.18 Jessup was
thus attentive to the ways that rules emerge from sources distinct from positivist-inspired
conceptions of state law, referencing “practices” as diverse as those of General Motors,
secret societies, towns, cities, or states.19 From the vantage point of Jessup’s writing,
climate law scholarship seems remarkably siloed. Invisible barriers separate studies of the
legal (climate law) and the interstate (the international climate governance architecture)
from the reality of a sub-state/supra-state/non-state (often described as transnational
climate governance). These are barriers that a transnational law approach both brings into
view and helps break down.
A formidable challenge in writing about climate law at any level is the sheer enormity of
the subject. When the relevant literatures are this vast and the legal developments so fastmoving, any commentary is partial, possibly outdated, and ignorant of important new
developments and literatures. As scholars devote much time and intellectual resources to
understanding and explaining new developments in context, it is easy to bemoan the
absence of a more critically-inspired scholarship.20 In many ways, attempting the sort of
border-crossing, practice-embracing, interdisciplinary-leaning transnational law approach
inspired by Philip Jessup seems either futile or fool-hardy in the context of climate law.
International relations scholars and political scientists are responsible for much of the
voluminous literature on transnational climate governance.21 This transnational work now
includes both climate mitigation and climate adaptation, resisting an earlier tendency to
focus on global efforts of climate mitigation and local examples of climate adaptation.22
16

Ibid, 2.
Ibid, 1.
18
“One notes that the problem of extracting and refining oil in Iran may involve - as it has - Iranian law,
English law, and public international law. Procedurally it may involve - as it has - diplomatic negotiations,
proceedings in the International Court of Justice and in the Security Council, business negotiations with
and among oil companies, and action in the Iranian Majlis.” Ibid, 6.
19
Ibid, 9.
20
Benoit Mayer, “The Critical Functions of Scholarship in Climate Law,” Climate Law 8, nos. 3–4 (2018):
151–60.
21
See Roger, Hale, and Andonova, “The Comparative Politics of Transnational Climate Governance,” 2.
22
Åsa Persson and Adis Dzebo, “Special Issue: Exploring Global and Transnational Governance of
Climate Change Adaptation,” International Environmental Agreements 19, no. 4 (2019): 357–58.
17
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This work frequently locates transnational developments in a separate sphere from state
law-making, analyzing it through questions of orchestration and effectiveness without fully
integrating it into the reality of plural sources and venues of law-making. The result is the
transnational realm tending to be seen as an add-on, and transnational governance as a
“complement” to the UN Climate Regime and the Paris Agreement architecture.23 Such a
view endorses the message that interstate processes are the core of international climate
change law. The transnational only exists as a sideshow, a realm that the core may choose
to engage with as the Paris Agreement has done.24
The Paris Agreement itself suggests, perhaps, another reality: an intense intermingling of
the public/private, state/non-state, hard law/soft law developments that currently dominate
climate regulation. The treaty replaces state ‘commitments’ with ‘contributions,’ and
introduces a compliance mechanism aimed at ‘facilitating’ rather than ‘enforcing’
compliance. The ‘ratcheting mechanism’ at the heart of the treaty has been described as
requiring support from cities, companies and other non-state actors to be effective. Indeed,
the treaty has been praised for strengthening the role of networks of state and non-state
actors in climate policy and technology.25 It has given unprecedented visibility to the
actions of non-state and sub-state actors. Indeed, the architecture put in place by the Paris
Agreement might only be functional in the context of massive infusions of funding from
private sources.26 The Paris Agreement itself might suggest that the types of initiatives that
a transnational law approach brings into view have already altered understandings of core
versus peripheral actors in lawmaking, challenging fundamental expectations of what
treaties can do, and of who is required for effective ‘implementation’. The form, nature,
and function of law-making under the Paris Agreement all seem to push back against a
view where the ‘transnational’ elements can be viewed separately from the ‘interstate,’ the
stuff of real public international law.
And yet, the Paris Agreement is far from an anomaly in its integration of public, private
and transnational lawmaking. Rather, it is representative in many ways of the structure of
international lawmaking on climate change, where treaties have reached deeply into
For a perspective that this transnational sphere of governance has “complemented” the interstate regime,
see Laura Mai, “The Growing Recognition of Transnational Climate Governance Initiatives in the UN
Climate Regime: Implications for Legal Scholarship,” Climate Law 8, nos. 3–4 (2018): 183.
24
Ibid, 184, 193.
25
Stephen Minas, “The Paris Agreement to Strengthen Role of Networks in Climate Policy and
Technology,” Global Policy, 23 December 2015,
http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/23/12/2015/paris-agreement-strengthen-role-networks-climatepolicy-technology.
26
Cinnamon Carlarne, Kevin R. Gray, and Richard Tarasofsky, “International Climate Change Law:
Mapping the Field,” in The Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law, ed. Kevin R. Gray,
Richard Tarasofsky, and Cinnamon Carlarne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 22.
23
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nations and regions without limitation from traditional conceptions of treaty
implementation and compliance. The emissions trading system and Clean Development
Mechanism emerging from the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change and the
1997 Kyoto Protocol have engaged actors other than State Parties and influenced private
actor conduct in both signatory and non-signatory states. In so doing, they have promoted
regulatory convergence and conformity to the Kyoto Protocol requirements by nonsignatories and non-state actors with regards to business and regulatory conduct.27
A transnational law lens is valuable in revealing the inequalities and asymmetries that mark
global or international approaches to climate change, in contemplating transnational legal
spaces not simply as add-ons, but instead as counterpoints to interstate and national
approaches. The “deep moral disagreements” and “deep divides” between climate justice
and neoliberalism have created competing visions for climate law’s objectives.28 Critiques
of the Paris Agreement reveal this intellectual battleground, describing it as a largely neoliberal document29 that allows individual liberties to “trump all other social and political
ideals.”30 The battleground emerges in the detailed studies of how legal responses to
climate change deepen existing social inequalities.31 And in scholarship revealing the
limitations of governance ‘by disclosure.’32
The point of conceiving of transnational climate law in terms of its visual field is not about
simply seeing and marveling at the infinite variety of forms and norms emerging in the
technical regimes of climate governance. Transnational law produces ways of knowing,
“particular understandings of the world and how it works.”33 Below, I identify three
particular dimensions of law-making that transnational climate law brings into closer view:
migrations, interactions, and revelations.

‘Kyoto compliance’ was a claim frequently made by companies, even though these private businesses
had no obligations under the treaty, and even when they were resident in non-signatory countries.
28
Rosemary Lyster, “The Idea of (Climate) Justice, neoliberalism, and the Talanoa Dialogue,” Journal of
Human Rights and the Environment 10, no. 1 (2019): 36. In these characterizations, she draws upon John S.
Dryzek, “The Deliberative Democrat’s Idea of Justice,” European Journal of Political Theory 12, no. 4
(2013): 329–46.
29
David Ciplet and J. Timmons Roberts, “Climate Change and the Transition to Neoliberal Environmental
Governance,” Global Environmental Change 46 (2017): 148–56.
30
Ibid, 149.
31
See e.g. Julia Dehm, “Authorizing Appropriations: Law in Contested Forest Spaces,” European Journal
of International Law 28, no. 4 (2017):1379–96.
32
See e.g. Brett Christophers, “Climate Change and Financial Instability: Risk Disclosure and the
Problematics of Neo-liberal Governance,” Annals of the American Association of Geographers 107, no. 5
(2017): 1109.
33
Duncan Kennedy, “The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault,” Legal Studies Forum 15, no. 4 (1991):
361.
27
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1. Migrations
The concept of the transnational adopted in the early writings of international relations
scholars was attentive to both the idea of movement and to the interaction of actors and
norms. Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane defined transnational interactions as “the
movement of tangible or intangible items across state boundaries when at least one actor is
not an agent of a government or an intergovernmental organization.”34 Today, when
practices of transferring legal norms, models, arguments, and judicial reasoning across
borders are a central feature of climate law, understanding how and why legal ideas move
becomes more urgent. This is particularly the case when environmental principles provide
a vital legal pivot point for illuminating rights and obligations in both legislation and
litigation.35 Accounts of the dynamics of climate law’s movements are needed to
complement the valuable micro-studies and maps that have already produced rich and
diverse understandings of the significance of networks of unconventional state and nonstate actors such as cities,36 government Ministers,37 investor-driven governance
networks,38 and judges.39 The movements in question extend beyond national borders and
permeate supra-national and sub-national lawmaking processes, private environmental
governance, sites of Indigenous lawmaking, legal cultures and traditions, judicial discourse
and international organisational practice.
The most visible faces of climate law emerge through databases collecting examples of
‘global’ climate legislation40 and climate litigation.41 For example, a 2018 Climate
Legislation Study calculated that more than 1,500 laws to curb climate change have now
Joseph S. Nye and Robert O. Keohane, “Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction,”
International Organizations 25, no. 3 (1971): 332 (emphasis mine).
35
See Eloise Scotford, Environmental Principles and the Evolution of Environmental Law (Oxford: Hart,
2017).
36
Jolene Lin, Governing Climate Change: Global Cities and Transnational Lawmaking (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2018); Taedong Lee, “Global Cities and Transnational Climate Change
Networks,” Global Environmental Politics 13, no. 1 (2013): 108–28.
37
See e.g. Karin Bäckstrand’s discussion of the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum. Karin
Bäckstrand, “Accountability of Networked Climate Governance: The Rise of Transnational Climate
Partnerships,” Global Environmental Politics 8, no. 3 (2008): 74–102.
38
Michael MacLeod and Jacob Park, “Financial Activism and Global Climate Change: The Rise of
Investor-Driven Governance Networks,” Global Environmental Politics 11, no. 2 (2011): 54–74.
39
Examples include the United Nations Environment Programme’s (“UNEP”) Environmental Rule of Law
Programme and the Asian Judges Network on Environment. Stephen Minas, “The Rise of Transnational
Networks in Climate Change Governance: A Study in Hybridity,” TLI Think! 5 (2015): 7–8.
40
For example, since 2010 the Grantham Research Institute (“GRI”) and Global Legislators Organisation
for a Balanced Environment (“GLOBE International”) have prepared studies of national law and policies
directly related to climate change mitigation and adaptation.
41
The Sabin Center for Climate Change Law at NYU Law School maintains databases of both US and nonUS litigation. Sabin Center for Climate Change, http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/resources/.
34
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been passed, an increase from around 70 laws in place two decades ago.42 Econometric
research drawing on earlier versions of this dataset of legislation indicates instances of
international policy diffusion from this data, asserting that the climate action one country
undertakes is likely to depend on prior climate legislation by other countries.43
These datasets, and the studies that draw on them, reveal several of the methodological
challenges plaguing climate law’s intellectual development. These challenges include the
problem of how to define climate legislation or litigation. Even more poignantly, they
reveal the complexity and unevenness that results from any attempt to provide a
comprehensive ‘global’ image of legislative activity or litigation, challenges that manifest
through the English-language bias of much published work, the tendency to only count and
compare federal legislation,44 and a common instinct to see directionality rather than
variation in how law moves from place to place.45
The message of ‘progress’ emerging from the growth in numbers of so-called climate laws
can be misleading. Given the significant pressure on states to be seen to be responding to
climate change, the concern develops that even while the number of ‘climate laws’ is
growing, actual reform is shallow and minimalist, focused on disclosing carbon emissions
rather than profoundly reducing them.46 The vast subject matter of what might be targeted
by climate legislation indeed makes comparison complex and threatens the rigour of
studies by comparing metaphorical “apples and oranges.”47 Climate laws target things as
diverse as introducing systems of tax credits48 and carbon pricing,49 promoting renewable
energy,50 disaster response,51 the preservation of glaciers,52 or strengthening resilience to

42

Michal Nachmany and Joana Setzer, Global Trends in Climate Change Legislation and Litigation: 2018
Snapshot (London: Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, 2018), 2.
43
Samuel Fankhauser, Caterina Gennaioli, and Murray Collins, “Do International Factors Influence the
Passage of Climate Change Legislation?” Climate Policy 16, no. 3 (2016): 318–31.
44
Terry Townshend et al., “Legislating Climate Change on a National Level,” Environment: Science and
Policy for Sustainable Development 53, no. 5 (2011): 7–9.
45
Lawrence Rosen, “Beyond Compare,” in Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions, ed.
Pierre Legrand and Roderick Munday (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 502–3.
46
See Ciplet and Roberts, “Climate Change and the Transition to Neoliberal Environmental Governance.”
47
Johann Dupuis & Robbert Biesbroek, “Comparing Apples and Oranges: The Dependent Variable
Problem in Comparing and Evaluating Climate Change Adaptation Policies,” Global Environmental
Change 23, no. 6 (2013): 1476–87.
48
Ley del Impuesto Especial Sobre Producción y Servicios, Diario Oficial de la Federación [“DOF”] 30-121980, última reforma DOF 15-11-2016 (Mexico).
49
Australian National Registry of Emissions Units Act 2011 (Cth.) (Australia).
50
Ley de Transición Energética, DOF 24-12-2015 (Mexico); The Energy Conservation Act, 2001, No. 52
of 2001, India Code.
51
Wet van 1 december 2011, Stb. 2011, 604 (The Netherlands).
52
Law No. 26639, 28 October 2010 (Argentina).
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food insecurity.53 And yet, the cross-sectoral orientation of climate change threats means
that legislation labelled ‘climate legislation’ may not even be where the action is or needs
to be.54
The wildfire-like spread of climate strikes in 2019, ignited by the actions of Swedish
teenage climate activist Greta Thunberg, has legal parallels in the explosive growth of
climate change lawsuits. These lawsuits have attracted ‘uptake’ and led to widespread
emulation even where the specific facts and relevant law makes replication unlikely,55 and
even when the cases have yet to successfully reach a trial court.56 Analysis of the forms of
climate litigation emerging in the Global South valuably extends an understanding of the
diverse forms and manifestations of climate litigation, as well as “stealthy” forms of
response in the face of judicial reluctance to engage directly with politically charged issues
of climate law and policy.57
This movement of legal forms, ideas, and models extends to financial and market
instruments. The EU has sought a position of climate leadership, in part by deliberately
developing models capable of transplantation elsewhere.58 The EU’s Emission Trading
Scheme has thus served as a model for many countries looking to introduce the legal
infrastructure necessary for domestic carbon markets. But it is proving challenging to
export.59 Voluntary markets for trading in forest carbon have also given rise to models for
the regulatory markets that have followed in their wake.60 For example, the carbon
53

Décret No. 2016-0102/P-RM, 26 February 2016, [2016] Journal Officiel de la République du Mali, 488.
See Jaclyn Rolfe, “Combating Climate Change with Words: The Effect of Incorporating ‘Climate
Change’ into Development-Regulating Laws,” Queensland Environmental Practice Reporter 15, no. 70
(2010): 164–79.
55
The well-known Dutch Urgenda decision, for example, has inspired copycat litigation in Belgium,
Switzerland and Ireland and also had a tangible influence on the environmental advocacy community in
Australia, despite significant differences between Australian common law and Dutch civil law. Urgenda
Foundation v. The State of the Netherlands, HA ZA 13-1396, C/09/456689 (The Hague Dist. Ct., 2015).
See Jacqueline Peel, Hari Osofsky, and Anita Foerster, “Shaping the Next Generation of Climate Change
Litigation in Australia,” Melbourne University Law Review 41, no. 2 (2017): 805.
56
While the Juliana lawsuit initiated in the United States in 2015 by twenty-one youth plaintiffs against
the United States and several of its officers has yet to advance to trial, it is widely cited as an inspiration
and model for other climate change litigation. Juliana v United States, No. 6:15-CV-01517-TC, 2016 WL
6661146 (D. Or. 10 November 2016).
57
See Jacqueline Peel and Jolene Lin, “Transnational Climate Litigation: The Contribution of the Global
South,” American Journal of International Law (2019): 55, DOI: 10.1017/ajil.2019.48.
58
Kati Kulovesi, “Climate Change in the EU External Relations: Please Follow my Example (or I Might
Force You to),” in The External Environmental Policy of the European Union: EU and International Law
Perspectives, ed. Elisa Morgera (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 115–48.
59
Anatole Boute, “The Impossible Transplant of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme: The Challenge of
Energy Market Regulation,” Transnational Environmental Law 6, no. 1 (2017): 59–85.
60
Natasha Affolder, “Transnational Carbon Contracting: Why Law’s Invisibility Matters,” in The Politics
of Private Transnational Governance by Contract, ed. A. Claire Cutler and Thomas Dietz (London:
Routledge, 2017), 225.
54
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disclosure movement informed regulatory developments of institutions such as the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Environmental Protection Agency in the
United States as they formalized carbon accounting standards.61
Yet despite all of this activity, the challenge remains of developing the terminology and
frameworks capable of describing law’s migrations so that they reflect the novel
polycentric forms of normativity visible in climate law practice. The model of the ‘legal
transplant’ continues to exert a powerful influence on both the vocabularies and the
methods of tracing the movement of legal norms even though it fails to capture the forms
of “‘borrowing,’ ‘mimicking,’ ‘impregnation’ and other forms of ‘travelling’” that shape
climate law developments.62 A singular language of diffusion or transfer risks obscuring
the fact that the movements of legal ideas in question are diverse and multi-directional –
ranging from the Kyoto Protocol’s borrowing of legal concepts from national pollution
control law63 to the circulation of legal norms through value chain contracting.64 Postcolonial scholarship can make significant contributions here by turning the lens towards
the particularity and historicity of human experience and challenging universal histories of
law’s movements across time and space.65
Climate law moves in diverse and unexpected ways, but that does not mean that practices
of dissemination and circulation of legal models are random or surprising. Legal reformers
and entrepreneurs (both public and private) have for decades pioneered and funded legal
readiness projects to provide templates for regulatory and legislative schemes that are
‘shovel ready’ for wider use in climate governance. These work to both advance, and
retard, progressive climate legislation. For example, the American Legislative Exchange
Council (ALEC)’s practice of supplying templates of ready-made model legislation such
as “Environmental Literacy Improvement Acts” for state implementation has been a key
strategy for institutionalizing climate denialism and doubt in US schools. Climate law
advocates have themselves sought to harness ALEC’s strategy by producing their own

David L. Levy, “Private Actors and Strategies in Global Environmental Governance: The Role of
Information Disclosure,” in Handbook of Global Politics, 2nd ed., ed. Peter Dauvergne (Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar, 2012), 315.
62
Peer Zumbansen, “Law & Society and the Politics of Relevance: Facts and Field Boundaries in
‘Transnational Legal Theory in Context,’” No Foundations 11 (2014): 3.
63
Jonathan B. Wiener, “Something Borrowed for Something Blue: Legal Transplants and the Evolution of
Global Environmental Law,” Ecology Law Quarterly 27, no. 4 (2001): 1297, 1308.
64
For a rare attempt to place law at the centre of the analysis of what have historically been addressed as
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versions of a “playbook” for progressive climate policies “ready to be distributed, ALEC
style, to local state and federal lawmakers.”66 The movement of these models and
prototypes extends far beyond state and national borders. Indeed, the production and
transnational dissemination of policies for climate adaptation are climate governance
strategies of many intergovernmental organizations.67 Given the significant role of
experimentation in climate governance68 and the diversity of institutions with climate
mandates, the production and circulation of models and prototypes of carbon regulation for
‘scaling up’ is a critical, but easily obscured, site of transnational legal activity.
2. Interactions
The task of tracing migrations of legal norms might mistakenly suggest that such
migrations are unilateral and unidirectional and only manifest through legislation and
judicial decisions. The practices of climate lawmaking speak to another reality, one of the
complex interaction of legal processes, actors and norms. Transnational legal theory
provides many entry points for exploring the significance of both the scale of interaction
and the interacting entities involved.69 Climate law scholarship illuminates in particular the
multiple and sometimes hidden layers of regulation, as well as the deformalisation of
climate law processes.70 A challenge for lawyers is that there are often no obvious answers
or solutions to be found by simply applying legal doctrine when discussing questions of
hierarchy and the conflict or simple co-existence of norms in the legal landscapes
governing climate issues today.71
Project-level studies of climate law transactions illustrate this reality up close. Tracing the
relevant legal frameworks applicable to a Clean Development Mechanism project leads to
a lengthy list of ‘relevant law’ ranging from international law sources, to the domestic law
of the host country and possibly the purchasing country, to the key contract itself (the
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Emissions Reduction Purchase Agreement) invoking both contract law and private
international law rules, and specifically referencing formal or informal best practice
standards, all the while subject to tax and accounting rules.72
There are stark implications for teaching climate law that emerge from the reality that
carbon contracting work demands diverse competencies across public international law,
private international law, and business, tax and contract law, as well as up-to-date
knowledge of the best practices and standards.73 The legal backdrop to these transactions
is complicated by the fact that the architecture for climate finance has evolved in a
fragmented manner with overlapping treaties, organisations, and mechanisms providing
rules and practices at global, regional, and national levels.74 The need for lawyers who are
able to appreciate the legal and financial complexities of carbon contract transactions while
knowledgeably navigating the human rights obligations and implications of those
transactions comes to light in particular through the study of REDD+ transactions.75
Scholarship continues to illuminate the fact that climate change solutions, and not just
climate change, can be disastrous for human rights.76
Furthermore, the oft-contested terrain of climate finance and clean energy projects reveals
that interactions between legal regimes are not always positive or synergistic. Mark Pollack
and Gregory Shaffer’s study of the interaction of transnational legal orders speaks to both
processes of “antagonistic interaction” and the result of those processes – “increasing
confusion rather than progressive development of law.”77 These interactions tend to elicit
commentary attentive to the surface-level tensions that plague climate law’s smooth and
effective development and spread. Simmering not far below the surface of climate law are
far deeper ideological conflicts.
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3. Revelations
William Twining’s call for an adaptation of Western intellectual traditions to engage with
new realities of global law has caused powerful ripples. This is not only the case in terms
of the substance of emerging scholarship on the globalization of law, but through
Twining’s methodological modelling of the practices of humility, self-reflection and selfcriticism.78 Twining engages in a masterful exercise of revelation, peeling away the
trappings of legal doctrine and legal methodology to reveal core assumptions embedded in
the Western legal tradition. His work presents a timely challenge for climate lawyers to
adopt a global gaze capable of extending across time, disciplines, cultures and legal
structures to unearth their underlying assumptions.
Given that climate law is an abstract term used to describe diffuse legal phenomena, it is
perhaps unsurprising that a search for climate law’s epistemology and core underlying
assumptions often leads to conflict and contestation. Climate law self-presents through
both fears and aspirations. It is seen hopefully as providing the mechanisms to harness
markets, correct their failures, and redirect economic activity. And it is seen fearfully as
capable of reduction to the tasks of carbon market-facilitating institutions (contract,
property and corporate forms) and responding to market asymmetries and dysfunctions.
Climate law is seen to emerge at the “clash of civilizations” between climate justice and
neoliberalism.79 This incongruity makes it perhaps unsurprising that little is written about
the assumed purpose of climate law.80
Yet by engaging with existential threats81 and inadequate legal responses,82 climate law
brings new and distinct pressure points to bear on the transnational law concept. It reveals
how little attention traditional legal theory has paid to the fact that Western legal traditions
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are predicated on exploitative views of the planet. Transnational legal theory, while
increasingly alert to the ‘North-South’ cleavage, as well as the problems endemic in
crudely framing the world into the Global North and Global South,83 has been less attentive
to the ‘them and us’ mentality that marks law’s treatment of the natural world.
Dipesh Chakrabarty asks whether “the climate crisis – as symptomatic of humanity’s
ecological overshoot – also signals the first glimpse we might have of a possible limit to
our very human-centered thinking about justice, and thus to our political thought as well.”84
While international law scholarship has taken important steps in tracing the historical
significance of exploitative visions of the environment for its own development, this legacy
extends to the contemporary contexts where the transnational legal gaze often focuses.85
The foundational importance for law of conceiving of nature as a resource comes into view
through recent histories of neoliberalism, which detail the institutionalisation of a
worldview contemplating “the earth as a vast territory of varying natural endowments that
needed to be exploited as thoroughly as possible through the mobility of capital, labor, and
commerce.”86 This vision has occupied an enduring role in international law’s concept of
natural environment as something to be exploited for human use.87 TWAIL-inspired
scholars have linked this historic view of the environment through to the realities of a
present-day environmental agenda established by and around the priorities and concerns of
affluent countries.88 It is a view that clashes with an alternative vision brought forward by
the realities of climate change – one of an intensely interdependent human-nature
relationship.
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III.

Methodological Challenges Facing Transnational Climate Law

1. The Negative Spaces: Unenvironmental Law and Unclean Energy Law

Figure 1: The two face, one vase illusion was developed around 1915 by the Danish psychologist
Edgar Rubin. It illustrates the work of negative space, allowing the viewer a mental choice between two
interpretations of an image. Ittelson, W. H. (1969). Visual Space Perception, Springer Publishing Company,
LOCCCN 60-15818

This chapter has already noted the ways in which discussions of ‘climate law’ often default
to focus on very recent legal initiatives manifesting through legislative change and judicial
decisions, the constantly evolving international law and institutional architecture, and the
climate governance initiatives emerging from networks and assemblages involving nonstate actors that self-advertise their climate change focus. These defaults tend to capture
explicit forms of rule-making responsive to historically recent climate change. Harder to
conceptualise, but worthy of attention, are the vast arenas of law-related activity relevant
to climate change that appear or work in the background free of any climate law packaging
or self-advertisement.
The artistic concept of negative space has parallels in law that can assist with such an
attempt to extend climate law’s content and scope. Negative space is the area between and
around objects in an image or photograph. An awareness of negative space allows the core
image to come more sharply into view, and reminds the viewer that perception involves
choices of interpretation. In law, such an approach means looking outside and around the
small amount of law conceived as ‘environmental law’ or ‘climate law’ to understand how
other aspects of law-making consist of unenvironmental law or unclean energy law. This
allows for a deeper inquiry into how legal systems perpetuate global warming and hamper
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efforts to address it, such as through mechanisms of indirect or hidden support for fossil
fuel activities.89
Examples of unenvironmental or unclean energy law are not always evident. They often
come to light gradually, as assumptions or defaults underlying common legal practices are
identified and challenged. Environmental impact assessment law offers a fertile ground for
studying these practices, as courts have affirmed the importance of analyzing the secondary
climate impacts of approvals for projects such as coal mines.90 Such decisions help to
illuminate the ‘negative space’ of climate law, using environmental impact assessment law
to acknowledge that the impact of a mine lies not only in its own carbon footprint, but
includes the reality that the coal it produces will eventually be burned.
Transnational environmental law’s ongoing search for new methods lead to an expansion,
and indeed a reimagination of what legal spaces are relevant to climate governance.91 Such
spaces come to light through work identifying the obstacles to effective accountability for
climate change-induced harms.92 They emerge through scholarship alert to how carbon
market regulation risks overwhelming other aspects of ‘carbon law,’ constraining law’s
role to the tasks of creating, supporting and occasionally disciplining ‘markets.’93 They are
revealed by approaching climate law as a social justice issue94 and by challenging the
tendency to premise legal responses to climate change “on forms of incremental
managerialism and proceduralism” and “ticking boxes.”95 It is this work of destabilizing
received categories and concepts of law that reveals transnational law’s ability to bring into
view alternative knowledges and the possibility of alternative futures.
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To date, the study of transnational legal activity has focused predominantly on space,
particularly by extending analysis beyond the nation-state, the “default container”96 of legal
study. Climate law scholarship has the power to challenge other forms of legal myopia,
bringing into view boundaries and borders other than the territorial. Considering the
complexity of climate change law and the vast workload to continually update the growing
datasets mapping national and regional approaches to climate law,97 it is easy to focus on
legal regulation in a context of presentism and looming future threats. 98 Scholarship that
seeks an understanding of climate crises from study of the very distant past illuminates
how it may be a trait of only present-day environmental regulation to look to economists
to define the universalizing models that will shape our future.99 Longer-term historical
narratives allow scholars to challenge the received wisdom on the history of climate
change.100 Such narratives teach contemporary climate activists “that their dissident views
in fact represent a long tradition of contestation.”101
2. The Place of Practice
Transnational law offers the tantalizing potential of richly accounting for the lived realities
of law through its practice. Philip Jessup addressed the need to better capture law’s practice
in explaining the very need for transnational law. His invocation of the practical was multidimensional. It encompassed an approach of seeing law as a way of addressing the
problems applicable to the “complex interrelated world community.”102 Appreciating these
problems, and their potential solutions, required practitioner knowledge and the ability to
transcend not only legal sub-disciplines but also to appreciate the relevance of extra-legal
processes and sources of norms.103 Jessup thus sought to align legal concepts with external
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“realities,”104 suggesting that rules emanate from “practices” as diverse as those of General
Motors, secret societies, towns, cities, or states.105
In the sixty years since Jessup’s Storrs lecture, appeals to practice in legal scholarship have
multiplied. The common vocabulary of practice and practices circulating through this
scholarship may hide the fact that very different ideas are being invoked in appeals to
practice. Indeed, as legal scholarship exhibits a growing comfort with sociolegal and
ethnographic methodologies that seek to understand law through social practices, it
remains difficult to elucidate whether the ‘practices’ being referred to are social practices,
legal practices, or something else entirely. Unfortunately, the language of practice seems
to be invoked somewhat more often than effort is put into articulating what is indicated by
it.
Simply put, legal scholarship seems to have sidestepped the detailed methodological
debates that have marked the “practice turns” in other disciplines such as international
relations or history.106 The consequence is that legal practice tends to be invoked as some
non-contentious and non-political body of common knowledge without being subjected to
the usual questions of legitimacy given to sources of law, and sources of knowledge about
law. In this fashion, practice acquires an assumed rationality, rather than an up-for-debate
one. The value of studying practices to reveal unconscious knowledges, which might be
taken for granted or obscured, and unseen dynamics of socialization107 remains no less
relevant to current transnational law scholarship.108
Climate law provides a poignant entry point into these debates. There is no debating the
need for pragmatic and strategic legal interventions. Yet legal expertise in evolving fields
such as climate engineering straddles challenging divides – calling for knowledge of
technical processes, their long-term governance implications, and drawing on an
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understanding of ecological integrity and principles of social and environmental justice.109
The particular knowledge, social practices, and contributions of climate lawyers are rarely
the subject of legal texts,110 but the influence of these lawyers is indisputable.111
Neil Walker’s Intimations of Global Law (2015) represents a rare effort to see in legal
practice “a reflection and expression of law’s diverse content and resource set.” 112 He
explains:
Transnational lawyers are not merely the ‘hired guns’ of big business, though that is a
significant part of the work of many and the defining function of some. They also
possess a more versatile remit as a ‘common carrier’ of the wider range of client and
broader constituency interests in regulation and litigation. The involvement of lawyers
in transnational processes is not simply an expression of professional economic interest
and power in globally expanded markets, therefore, but also speaks to their relationship
to wider questions of public policy and social justice.113
Walker presents a kaleidoscopic account of the jurisgenerative activities through which
transnational lawyers, including academic lawyers are “taking law to the world.”114 This
work challenges the myth of a faceless transnational realm. Instead, it populates that realm
with the activities of globally inclined academics, judges and other legal experts who are
“increasingly well placed to imagine new ways of framing, naming, patterning and
projecting in global terms the unwieldy multiverse of transnational law to which they and
their fellow legal specialists have done so much to contribute at the levels of practice,
interpretation, drafting and design.”115
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3. The Faceless Transnational
The spaces and rhythms of transnationalism favour a visual fix on processes, flows,
networks, and governance arrangements that may be only partially tethered to people.116
This tendency towards abstraction manifests in many ways.117 It is evident in dominant
vocabularies describing actors, ranging from non-state actors,118 to treatment of the Global
South as a monolith,119 to the equally abstract concept of a climate migrant.120 It is reflected
in ways of identifying climate law’s subjects as legal persons such as corporations, states,
municipalities, or as abstract segments of society such as consumers or polluters or car
drivers, rather than locating ourselves as critical subjects.121
While interdisciplinary inquiry is a critical aspect of climate law scholarship, such inquiry
can be threatened by reductionist practices – practices involving reliance on truncated
insights from ‘science’ or ‘economics,’ rather than acknowledging the complexity
underlying scientific and economic thought and ways of knowing. The search for
measurable outcomes of climate governance processes unsurprisingly privileges thinking
of the world through measurable targets, goals, and units of greenhouse gas emissions.
Carbon markets require the ability to attach a dollar amount to a unit of sequestered carbon,
carbon kept out of the atmosphere for a specific period of time. The depoliticization of
governance by indicators and other calculative practices is now well-explored in
scholarship,122 but remains difficult to resist. The simplification and abstraction demanded
by “measurementality” permeates law’s engagement with climate change as the science–
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policy interface becomes tasked with generating user-friendly scientific knowledge that is
considered politically and economically relevant.123
Climate plans, climate strategies, and the creation of forms of greenhouse gas emission
accounting require particular forms of scientific and economic knowledge created by
expert groups. Lawyers occupy key roles in creating the blueprints of climate law
governance, participating in global technical expert groups, chairing committees, and
drafting and editing committee reports. These mechanisms of generating climate law
norms, which incorporate public and private institutions, are encapsulated in practices of
‘law-making’ that, as Martti Koskenniemi argues, represent a shift from the task of
‘legislating’:
The most important ‘laws’ in Europe or the world are not those enacted in
parliaments but those managed by economic or technical experts so as to avoid
collapse but ultimately so as to produce optimal outcomes. In this optimistic
understanding, laws are not about what we ‘want’ but what we ‘know’ about the
world: they declare truths that scientists, economists and technical experts have
uncovered or will do so in the nearest future.124
The rhythms of carbon accounting that animate approaches to climate law-making contrast
sharply with the rhythms of social and environmental interconnectedness and the realities
of actual people and places, which human rights approaches seek to acknowledge.125 The
temporal dimensions of climate law governance, combining a fixation with mapping the
polycentric reality of very recent and emerging governance arrangements and an everlooming yet unknown future, further shifts our gaze towards the abstract.
The carbon atom has become the central organizing logic, the faceless abstract entity that
has mobilized the transformation of law and governance canvassed in this chapter. And
yet, transnational law theory continues to focus on disruptions caused by shifting
conceptions of the state, with only occasional acknowledgement of the consequences for
law of the disruptions caused by recent human interference with the Earth’s systems,
geophysical processes and cycles. The intrusion of earthly life into debates about the
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changing contours of political community represents “a far more radical challenge than the
postulation of the supposedly ‘post-sovereign’ conditions of late modernity.”126 But the
types of lively debates the concept of ‘the Anthropocene’ has fostered in the natural and
social sciences have yet to significantly influence the direction of transnational legal
scholarship.127 Even as legal thinking turns to draw on Earth systems governance128 and
new forms of planetary politics that acknowledge the Earth as “a new political actor,”129
the reliance on abstractions does not go away, but simply shifts focus. The new boundaries
brought into view are planetary ones, the epistemological binary under threat is the human–
nature divide, and the carbon atom becomes a powerful new form around which life is both
calculated and politicised.130
Concluding Thoughts
The ecological overshoot of humanity requires us to both zoom into the details of
intra-human injustice—otherwise we do not see the suffering of many humans—
and to zoom out of that history, or else we do not see the suffering of other species
and, in a manner of speaking, of the planet.131
Transnational climate law offers a particularly rich opportunity for such zooming in and
zooming out. While the term transnational climate law may only be an abstract label
bringing into view disparate processes of lawmaking, the term is broad enough to allow
investigation of law’s border crossing travels, and its boundary-piercing nature. While
climate law scholarship still privileges positivist accounts of law by counting new
examples of federal legislation and providing extended commentary on climate lawsuits,
the reality of climate law-making in other venues including carbon markets, consumer
approaches, expert committees, carbon disclosures, and human rights indicators, is far from
hidden. Transnational law scholarship has problematized the shifts propelled by these
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realities, the related assumption of core governance functions by non-state actors, and the
asymmetries of knowledge and power that underlie many carbon projects and transactions.
While climate governance tends to focus on the present and near-future, scholars are
beginning to explore law’s complicity in entrenching the “carbon footprint” that “haunts
every step of the history of industrial and colonial expansion of the last centuries.”132
Bruno Latour’s Down to Earth: Politics in the New Climatic Regime (2012) draws attention
to the last century’s social movements’ massive and profound failure to connect the dots
between social and environmental conflicts.133 This work challenges scholars to explain
not only the complicated current terrain of transnational lawmaking, but the legal
transformations that have not taken place. The non-occurrence of transformative climate
law may indeed be one of the consequences of leaving unchallenged a particular and
dominant vision of law, one whose solitudes continue to separate the environment from the
social.
Writing about climate law is, and may well remain, a rather miserable endeavor. It may be
useful to explore why this is the case. A subject as broad and disparate as climate
lawmaking means writing in a context where the problems of massive incompleteness of
knowledge, outdatedness, narrowness, and pointlessness are one’s constant companions.
Accusations of alarmism co-exist with the ever-present threat that one is recklessly underplaying what is at stake. Transnational climate law takes some steps towards addressing
these challenges. It brings into view shifting territorial as well as conceptual spaces of lawmaking. Yet it leaves the boundary separating Humans from Nature largely intact, and the
planetary boundaries that define law’s operating space still largely unacknowledged.
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